It is widely believed that executives value stock options at less than market (Black-ScholesMerton) value because of suboptimal ownership, risk aversion, vesting, and illiquidity. Implicit in this finding is the subtle assumption that executives are, like shareholders, price takers who have no ability to influence the underlying stock. Clearly executives have the ability to influence the stock, because that is the purpose of granting them the options. As such, executives are likely to be more willing to hold options than would ordinary investors, a fact not captured in conventional models. We develop a model in which executives exert costly effort to alter the stock return distribution. We find that when executives act optimally, their options are worth much more than generally believed and potentially more than the market values of the options. Thus, conventional wisdom that the cost of stock options is less than the market value of these options is not necessarily true as these options can be worth more than the Black-Scholes-Merton value. In addition, this factor changes the behavior of early exercise, leading to exercise at higher threshold prices for higher quality executives and can make shorter term options be worth more than longer term options.
Introduction
It is a widely accepted result that executives value stock options at lower than market or Black-Scholes-Merton values. This finding results from the fact that executives are typically compelled to maintain large personal investments in their companies, their stock options cannot be traded and the options usually contain vesting periods. These factors limit the e x e c u t i v e ' s ability to diversify. Consequently newly-granted stock options are viewed as having less value to an executive than would tradable stock options have to an ordinary investor.
These arguments, however, ignore a significant factor that could greatly alter the e x e c u t i v e ' s p e r c e p t i o n o f t h e v a l u e s o f s t o c k o p t i o n s . Mo d e l s i n t h e l i t e r a t u r e t y p i c a l l y v a l u e these instruments from the perspective of the executive as simply a badly diversified investor whose positions cannot be liquidated to achieve an optimal position, or if not optimal, at least one with higher expected utility. With the executive having no ability to materially change his portfolio, he simply values options and restricted stock at much lower than their conventional market values. In short, executives do not particularly like options and restricted stock as much as do ordinary investors. But these models make one key and subtle assumption that is simply not true: they assume that executives are price-taking investors.
A price taker cannot influence the outcome of a risky decision. Financial models almost always assume that no investor can change the current or future price by trading or by any other actions. But executives can clearly influence the outcomes of their options. Indeed, the ability of executives to influence the stock price, which is the variable that determines the option payoff, is the principal reason why they are granted the options. If executives can influence the payoffs of their options, it is reasonable to believe that they will value their options more highly than if it is assumed they cannot. Indeed it is possible they might value their options more highly than would ordinary price-taking investors.
Naturally options are awarded to induce executives to take actions that will increase the value of the stock. It is certainly in the interest of the executive to push the price of the stock as high as possible. But executive actions that increase the price of the stock, such as working harder, have a cost that comes in the form of disutility of effort. Executives cannot be presumed to be able or willing to push the stock price up without limit. Clearly they, as do all people, trade off the rewards from extra effort with the costs.
It is interesting to note that in the literature, options have been regarded as somewhat less than optimal instruments for inducing greater effort on the part of executives. The reason is principally that executives do not value options as highly as the cost to the firm. Consequently, options are considered to be fairly inefficient as incentive devices. But these conclusions have been drawn under the assumptions of conventional models of executive stock option value, that is, executives are assumed to be price takers. If executives can indeed influence the payoffs of their options, what greater incentive is there? Thus, academic research, which fails to provide strong support for the use of options as effective incentivizing devices, conflicts with practice, in which options are widely used. As we show in this paper, the reason may well be that models of executive stock options fail to capture a critical element of the attractiveness of these instruments to executives. This paper examines the valuation of executive stock options under the assumption that executives can influence the outcomes of their options. We assume that executives can shift the probability distribution of the stock. In accordance with the standard Modigliani-Miller approach, we assume that asset investment policy and thus risk is unchanged. In short, executives are able to make good outcomes more likely and bad outcomes less likely. Upon being granted options, executives decide on the effort they will expend to achieve this result. Their chosen effort is not observable, however, until a later time. Therefore, the stock price does not reflect this effort until it is observed. When that occurs, the stock registers an abnormal return. Executives must then maintain their effort to sustain a normal return thereafter. Following these assumptions we can then value their options. As we will see, their options are worth more than in the standard pricetaking case. Indeed, in a few cases we will find that their options are worth more than would be valued by an outside investor. In other words, executive stock options can even be worth more than the Black-Scholes-Merton value . In addition, we examine their early exercise behavior in light of the incorporation of effort into the model.
In Section 2, we briefly review the previous research. In section 3, we develop a model f o r v a l u i n g s t o c k o p t i o n s t h a t i n c o r p o r a t e s t h e e x e c u t i v e ' s q u a l i t y a n d e f f o r t . We also discuss how we will implement the model. In Section 4, we perform the comparative static analysis of executive effort and option values. We summarize the implications and conclusion in Section 5.
Previous Research
In the conventional principal-agent model, such as Grossman and Hart (1983) , principals design a compensation package to maximize the expected payoff net of the cost of compensation.
The maximization is subject to the constraint that agents choose their optimal efforts by maximizing their own expected utility. The effect of executive effort is reflected in the probability and/or the payoff of each outcome of the firm' sprojects. Starting from this fundamental intuition, many researchers search for optimal sharing rules, or contracts, between agents and principals under different assumptions. For example, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) analyze the problem of intertemporal incentives in a continuous-time framework. They find that the principal problem can be solved under the static framework in which the executive can change the mean of the multivariate normal distribution and principals use a linear sharing rule.
Following their analysis, we make a similar assumption about the effect of effort on the expected stock return.
Another stream in the executive compensation literature is to find the values of different components of the executive compensation package. This approach recognizes that executives are different from individual investors in several respects. For example, executives cannot sell short their firms ' stock and legal requirements restrict their ability to hedge the risk of their stock and stock options. In addition, executives must follow other specific constraints, such as vesting periods or disclosure regulations. Therefore, conventional market-based valuation, with its few restrictions, is not appropriate for executive compensation. Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia (1991) recognize this problem and use a certainty equivalent approach to find option values while taking executive and firm characteristics into account. Hall and Murphy (2000, 2002) , Henderson The conventional principal-agent model assumes that executives can exert effort to maximize firm value. The goal of a principal is to choose a compensation scheme to motivate an executive to exert the target, or desired, effort. If this is the case, then the effect of executive effort should affect the values of stock options to the executive. Cadenillas, Cvitanic, and Zapatero (2004) show that levered stock is an optimal compensation policy to induce optimal effort in many situations, such as for firms with high expected return or large size or executives with high quality. They, however, do not analyze the effect of executive effort on executive option values. In addition, they do not consider the effect of other components of executive wealth, such as cash or the firm' s s t o c k , wh i c h c a naffect optimal effort. To bridge this gap, we take into account cash and t h e f i r m' s s t o c kin the e x e c u t i v e ' s portfolio and examine how effort affects executive option values. Palmon et al (2004) develop an effort-based model in which case flows are uniformly distributed and executive effort can shift the end points of the distribution. They use this model to examine the question of what is the optimal moneyness at which to issue options. They find that unless there are tax-related disadvantages, in-the-money options are better for shareholders. Hodder and Jackwerth (2005) focus on similar issues. They assume that the executive has the ability to control the risk level of the firm, and develop a discrete-time model to value executive stock options. They find that the certainty equivalent values of these options are higher than the Black-Scholes-Merton values under some circumstances. Their model is closest in spirit to ours, but there are four major differences. First, they assume that the executive can dynamically control the stochastic p r o c e s s f o r t h e f i r m' s value by using forward contracts to h e d g e t h e f i r m' s r i s k y t e c h n o l o g y . Under their assumption, however, the terminal return distribution can be trimodal, which is somewhat awkward and uncommon in financial models.
In contrast, we assume that executives have the ability to influence firm performance by shifting the expected return without altering risk.
2 Second, they incorporate the cost of executive effort by assuming penalty function in the form of a lower boundary on firm value that triggers dismissal. We consider the cost of effort in the form of a quadratic disutility function commonly used in the literature. Third, in their analysis, the possibility of exercising early is independent of the time period, which is inconsistent with the general motivation of early exercise in which time is always a factor. The interest on exercise proceeds certain affects the early exercise decision, and, therefore, should be taken into account in the behavior of early exercise. Finally, they assume that because hedging strategies are represented by the portion of the hedged assets, there is no difference in hedging strategy among executives. We argue that different executives have different abilities, which result in different outcomes from their effort. Therefore, we assume executives have different qualities that have diverse effects on firm values.
There are some researchers who focus on the effect of executive effort on the incentives of stock-based compensation. Schaefer (1998) develops a simplified agency model and derives the functional form for optimal effort and finds that optimal effort is positively related to firm size and marginal productivity of effort, but negatively related to risk aversion and the variance of firm value. Feltham and Wu (2001) analyze the incentive effects of stocks and options with consideration of executive effort. Under the assumption of a normally distributed terminal stock price, they find that the number of options granted to induce a certain level of effort increases with the exercise price when the effort does not influence the f i r m' s o p e r a t i n grisk. They conclude that the cost of compensation increases with the exercise price. If the effort influences both the mean and the variance, then conclusions about incentive effects of stock and options depend on the impact of effort on firm risk. When the impact is large, then the compensation cost decreases with the exercise price.
There are two major differences between the Feltham and Wu model and ours. In their model, the executive has only stock or options and, therefore, they do not consider the effect of the other component of t h e a g e n t ' s we a l t h . This consideration can affect the number of shares of stock or options needed to induce the executive effort in their analysis. In addition, their assumption of normality for the terminal stock price is not consistent with the conventional lognormal assumption of the stock price distribution, which is what we use. Lambert and Larcker (2004) use a principal-agent model to find the optimal contract and compare their results with those in Feltham and Wu (2001) . They find that option-based contracts in general dominate restricted stock-based contracts and that most options in the optimal contracts are out-of-the-money options. In addition, they also note the invalidity of the first order condition in the a g e n t ' s maximization problem. They argue that expected utility is not a concave function of executive effort when the convexity of the o p t i o n ' s p a y o f f d o mi n a t e s t h a t o fthe a g e n t ' s d i s u t i l i t y o f e f f o r t . We find, however, one major reason for this problem is because the number of options increases with the level of effort in their model. In contrast, we fix the number of options granted to an executive, and then find the optimal executive effort. Therefore, the first-order condition is valid in our model. 
Theoretical Model
We start the analysis from a time line of an option grant and add the feature of executive effort to determine how executive effort influences stock prices and when these effects occur.
Executives determine their optimal effort to maximize expected utility, which reflects the benefit and the cost of the effort. Assuming that the executive has a negative exponential utility function and that non-option wealth includes cash that earns the risk-free rate, and the firm' s s t o c k , we apply the certainty equivalent approach of Lamber, Larcker, and Verrecchia (1991) to find the value of the executive ' s stock options.
Determination of Optimal Effort
Executive effort is not directly observable but should be reflected in the stock price when this effort leads to improved firm performance. When the effect of effort is realized, investors then adjust the expected return. Because the e x e c u t i v e ' s quality and effort are private information, we assume that there is no stock price reaction on the grant date. 4 At some point prior to maturity, executive effort, will be identified by the e x e c u t i v e ' s performance evaluation, which is reflected in the abnormal performance of the stock. The time line below explains the setting.
At time 0 the firm grants the executive stock options with a maturity T. The executive then decides on his optimal effort over the lifetime of the options. At time 0, the current stock price is S 0 and the expected return is  E r . At time idt, the effect of the executive' s effort is reflected in the stock price and results in an abnormal return over the period of t = 0 to idt. From that point forward, investors price the e x e c u t i v e ' s effort into the stock, so no further abnormal returns arising from this grant would be observed. Executives will, however, most likely receive additional grants before the expiration of the first grant, and these additional grants can produce new abnormal returns.
Let S t be the stock price that would exist in the absence of an option grant. We are interested in determining the stock price that would exist if the option is awarded and the executive decides to put forth additional effort. As noted, the market determines the results of the e x e c u t i v e ' s e f fort at time idt and the stock price changes to
4 The evidence on this issue is somewhat mixed and is complicated by several factors. Grant awards are rarely discovered by investors until a later date, there is evidence (Yermack (1997) ) that grant dates are manipulated around the announcement of good news, and by increasing evidence over the controversial practice of backdating (Lie (2005) S is the stock price after taking the effort into account at time idt. 5 idt S is the stock price on the grant date with minimum effort equal to one, q is the measure of executive effort over the period of time t = 0 to idt, and δis the measure of executive quality, which is the elasticity of the stock price with respect to executive effort, 0  . 6 Under the same effort, the higher the δ , the higher is the after-effort stock price, that is, high quality executives have high δ .
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We need not specify when the effort is expended during the interval t = 0 to idt. It could come early, late, or spaced evenly throughout. 8 We assume, however, that investors do not realize the results of the effort until the end of the interval, and these results will translate into an abnormal return. Keep in mind that the executive continues to expend the effort after t = idt, but it generates no abnormal return because investors are now aware of the e x e c u t i v e ' s effort and build it into the stock price. In facts, if the executive fails to expend the effort after t = idt, there will be a negative abnormal return.
We assume the stock price without effort, t S , follows the Geometric Brownian motion
where αis the mean, σis the standard deviation of the raw stock return, and w t is the standard Brownian motion. We assume the continuously compounded Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) holds so that
 , where f r the risk-free rate, βis the measure of systematic risk, and   m E r is the expected market return. In this paper, we also assume that early exercise decisions have no effect on the e x e c u t i v e ' s choice of optimal effort. 9 Therefore, executives determine their optimal effort immediately after accepting the compensation contract.
We can view Equation (1) in terms of the expected return by dividing by 0 S and taking expectation for the log returns on both sides:
5 Camara and Henderson (2005) use this relation to analyze the manipulation of stock price and accounting earning. Palmon et al (2004) assume use a similar model in which executives can exert effort to increase the upper and lower bound of the cash flow distribution. Grout and Zalewska (2006) apply a similar assumption that the mean of the terminal firm value increases by εwhen executives make the additional effort. In addition, they also assume there is no impact on the variance of the distribution. 6 When executives exert minimum effort, q = 1, the stock price is independent of executive quality. Later in this paper, when we refer to the elasticity of stock price, we mean the elasticity of stock price with respect to executive effort. 7 T h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s t h e s a me a s t h a t i n C a d e n i l l a s , C v i t a n i c , a n d Z a p a t e r o ( 2 0 0 4 ) . T h e y me n t i o n t h a t δ i s an indicator of the quality of the executive. 8 If there is an immediate market reaction, which has been documented in some studies, the abnormal return would be observed early. 9 In Section 3.3., we analyze the effect of optimal effort on the early exercise decision. To limit the interaction between optimal effort and the early exercise decision, we make the assumption that there is no effect of early exercise on optimal effort.
Under the geometric Brownian motion assumption, the log return without effort follows a normal distribution with mean μand standard deviation σ . We define * as the after-effort expected log return and η as the incremental expected return resulting from executive effort:
Therefore, we relate executive effort to incremental expected return as follows:
From Equation (4), we know that the executive' s effort is an exponential function of incremental expected return, time length, and executive quality. 10 As noted, the market price converges to the price that reflects effort at t = idt. Any price prior to that time, such as S dt , does not reflect effort.
Nonetheless, the executive will have a private opinion of the price, * dt S , which by recursive evaluation, will equal, dt S q  .
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What is happening is that the executive' s e f f o r t s h i f t s t h e e x p e c t e d r e t u r n u p wa r d . 12 The e x e c u t i v e ' s effort is increasing the probability of states in which higher returns are received while decreasing the probabilities of states in which lower returns are received. But we must be careful about the terminology used. Because we observe the results of the executive' s e f f o r t i n t h e abnormal return, we must be precise about how we define the expected return. The executive shifts the distribution by η . If we incorporate ηinto the expected return, there is naturally no abnormal return. Thus, prior to t = idt, we will distinguish the expected return without effort from the expected return with effort, the latter of which is not observed by investors. From the
 is called an expected return or, more accurately, a required return. This return is what investors require from a firm with systematic risk β . The expected return from the e x e c u t i v e ' s standpoint, however, is E(r * ), which is the sum of E(r) and η , because executives have private information about their quality and effort that can influence firm performance. We will call this measure the " expected return with 10 If δ= 0, then η= 0. The stock price process becomes the original process with minimum level of effort of q = 1. Therefore, the case of δ= 0 has the same effect on expected return as q = 1, even though the interpretations of these two cases are different. 11 At time idt,
. Continuing back to any time jdt gives
, which is the executive' s p r i v a t e assessment of the value of the stock and reflects the additional information he knows about his effort. 12 Recall that we are not changing the risk. ) and ηconverges to zero. Executives still exert the same level of optimal effort but there is no incremental expected return.
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Upon receipt of the grant, the executive must decide on the amount of effort. We assume the executive has three components in his portfolio, which are $c in cash, m s h a r e s o f t h e f i r m' s stock, and n stock options. The terminal wealth is
where T is the maturity of the stock options, r f is the risk-free rate, * T S is the terminal after-effort stock price, and K is the exercise price of n options. As described, we assume that the executive can affect firm value by choosing his level of effort and therefore increasing the return of the stock. 14 On the one hand, the benefit of the effort is to change the values of the stock and option components of the e x e c u t i v e ' s wealth through * T S . If effort were costless, however, the executive would be motivated and able to increase the stock price without limit. Therefore, we must impose a cost to effort. This occurs in the form of disutility in the executive' s u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n .
Following the related literature, we define the disutility function of the effort as a quadratic function. 15 To analyze the trade-off relationship mentioned above in the expected utility model, we represent executive effort and disutility in terms of incremental expected return. Therefore, the disutility function of effort is
where idt is the period over which the effort converts into the abnormal return. As noted before, investors become aware of the results of executive effort at time idt and adjust the expected return to the expected return with effort. After that, there is no longer an abnormal return from executive effort but executives must maintain the same level of effort.
13 Executives can, however, receive new grants that can lead to more abnormal returns. 14 In general, if the effort comes from the executive' s a b i l i t y , t h e n i t s h o u l d h a v e a l o n g -term effect. In contrast, if the effort comes from inside information or stock price manipulation, then its effect should last only for a very short term. Because effort is unobservable, the market will know the executive' s e f f o r t gradually through observing other proxies for the effort and updating the information in the stock price. If the effort comes from insider information or manipulation, then the stock price will reflect the information immediately after it becomes public. Therefore, the effect of this kind of effort exists in only the short term. 15 Interested readers can refer to Baker and Hall (2004) , and Cadenillas, Cvitanic, and Zapatero (2004) . Some researchers use a modified version of a quadratic function in the agency model for tractability. See Prendergast (1999) .
Otherwise investors can identify the change of effort at the next observation point and there will be a negative abnormal return. To compute the disutility of effort over the entire option life, we assume that the total effort from time 0 to time T is the product of effort in each interval of idt, t h a t i s , η T = η idt. Thus, from Equation (4), total effort can be expressed as
To compare the results between our model and other valuation models that do not take executive effort into account, we consider only the disutility of the extra effort. 16 The disutility function becomes
Finally, to find the optimal effort in the expected utility model, we assume the executive has negative exponential utility with coefficient of absolute risk aversion ρ :
The executive determines the optimal effort by maximizing the expected utility with respect to terminal wealth net of the disutility of effort, which is
In the objective function, we assume additively separable utility for terminal wealth and the disutility of effort. 
Executive Option Values
To operationalize this model, we need to be able to identify the effort that an executive would expend and, ultimately, the value of the option, taking that effort into account. In a utilitybased model, the typical method of finding the value of an executive stock option is the certainty equivalent approach. The basic concept is that the option value is the cash amount, CE, received at the beginning that has the same expected utility as the stock option. Therefore, the option value is determined by solving for CE in the following equation, 16 In this paper, we assume that the cost of minimum effort is zero. Because the incremental expected return is zero in the minimum effort case, the original expected return is determined by co-movement with the market, which is out of the e x e c u t i v e ' s control. Therefore, no extra cost is needed in the minimum effort case. 17 To be sure of the comparability between the utility of terminal wealth and cost of effort, we assume the executive has negative exponential utility rather than power utility. Both types of utility functions, however, are extensively used in the literature.
The value of one stock option is, therefore, CE n . There are, however, some differences between our approach and that of others. First, in our case the future stock price on both sides is a function of the after-effort stock price. Because we assume that stock options provide incentives for executives to exert more effort than the minimum level, cash compensation would not ordinarily have the same incentive. 18 The left-hand side specification, however, is merely a technical mechanism for determining the amount of cash that has the same expected utility as the option. Using this approach does not imply that granting the executive cash in lieu of options would generate the same incentives, as clearly it would not. The cash amount, CE, merely serves to capture the value of the incentivizing options on the right-hand side. Thus, CE is technically the cash amount that the executive would accept and be equally incentivized as with the options.
Note also that because executives invest a portion of their wealth in company stock, stock also provides some incentives, so we include it on both sides.
We shall need to determine the optimal effort before we apply the certainty equivalent approach, because the effort that achieves the maximum expected utility determines the stock return distribution that determines the certainty equivalent value of the option. Also, to avoid the incentive for the executive to take actions to drive up the stock price without limit, we must take into account the disutility of effort. Therefore, our option value is the value of CE in the following:
In Equation (8), 1* T S is the stock price after taking into account the optimal effort from stock ownership, and 2* T S is the stock price after taking into account the optimal effort from stock and option ownership. Then 1 and 2  are the corresponding incremental expected returns on the left-hand and right-hand sides respectively. We use this approach to find the CE for the continuoustime case of no early exercise. Details are provided later. When the options are exercisable early, we take a similar but slightly different approach.
Early Exercise
Other factors that can affect the executive option value are early exercise and the vesting schedule. Early exercise and optimal effort raise an interesting question about which comes first.
Does the ability to exercise early affect effort or does effort affect the early exercise decision? It is impossible to definitely state that one is cause and one is effect. We assume that effort is chosen independent of the existence of the early exercise feature, which means that optimal effort would be no different for American options than for European options. But we then assume that effort can affect the decision of when to exercise early. If early exercise occurs, we invest the proceeds in the risk-free asset until the maturity date of the options. The executive will exercise early when the expected utility of early exercise is higher than that from holding the options.
As is commonly required when analyzing the early exercise of standard options, a numerical method is used to capture the early exercise decision. We use a binomial tree. The expected utility at each node in a binomial tree after time t is
where   U W  is the utility from early exercise. Following this rule, we can find the expected utility considering early exercise at time 0. Then, the value of the options is the cash amount received at time 0 and invested in the risk-free asset that provides the same expected utility.
Parameter Setting
To estimate the option values, we assume a range of reasonable values for the model inputs. There are twelve parameters in the model, which can be grouped into Black-ScholesMerton variables, CAPM variables, and executive properties.
Black-Scholes-Merton Variables
The Black-Scholes-Merton variables are the current stock price, S 0 , the exercise price, K, the risk-free rate, r f , the volatility of the stock return, σ , and the time to maturity, T.
19 Using S t a n d a r d a n d P o o r ' s ExecuComp, we find that between 2000 and 2005 more than 99% of stock options are granted at-the-money. The mean exercise price in 2005 is $32.47 and the median is around $29.20. Therefore, we use $30 as the exercise price and focus on at-the-money options.
19 To simplify the analysis and focus on the issue of optimal effort, we assume no dividends.
We also consider out-of-the-money and in-the-money options by examining stock prices of $20
and $40 respectively. For the risk-free rate, the three-month T-bill rate is 4.95% and 10-year treasury maturity rate is 5.09% in July 2006. We use 5% as the risk-free rate in our simulations.
The average volatility reported in ExecuComp between 2000 and 2005 to compute the Black-Scholes-Merton value is 47%. Therefore, we use 50% as the benchmark volatility and use 30% and 70% to represent less and more volatile companies respectively. For the maturity, the most common time to maturity for original issue executive stock options is ten years. To examine how option values change over their lives, we examine ten-, five-, and three-year options.
CAPM Variables
There are three variables in the traditional CAPM, which are the risk-free rate, the expected market return, and the systematic risk measure, beta. We use the value-weighted return on all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks as a proxy for the expected market return. The average market return from 1992 to 2005 is 11.88%. 20 Therefore, we use 12% as the benchmark for the expected market return. To observe how changes in market conditions affect executive effort and the values of executive stock options, we also run the simulations under 10% and 14%
expected market returns. We use beta of 1 as the benchmark and betas of 0.5 and 1.5 to show the results for firms with different levels of systematic risk. The risk-free rate is the same as that mentioned in the previous section.
Executive Properties
In this model, as well as in many similar models in the literature, there are three c o mp o n e n t s i n t h e e x e c u t i v e ' s p e r s o n a l we a l t h : cash, the firm' sstock, and stock options. As noted, we assume the executive has negative exponential utility, which has the characteristic of constant absolute risk aversion. Moreover, the elasticity of the stock price is also a crucial component in our model in relation to others. Therefore, we establish a benchmark value for the elasticity of the stock price, non-option wealth, number of shares of stock and options, and coefficient of absolute risk aversion.
Bitler at el. (2005) estimate the effect of executive effort, represented by weekly working hours, on firm performance. They find that the elasticity of firm sales with respect to working hours is 0.40, and the elasticity of firm profit is 0.55 and both are significant at the 1% level.
Based on their result, we set the elasticity of the stock price with respect to executive effort of 0.25 as a benchmark, which implicitly assume that the elasticity of the stock price to firm sales 20 T h e d a t a c o me s f r o m t h e d a t a l i b r a r y o n Ke n n e t h F r e n c h ' s we b s i t e . T h e d a t a r a n ge from 1992 to 2005 and are consistent with the data in the ExecuComp database. The average market return from 1927 to 2005 is 12.20%.
and profit are 0.625 and 0.45 respectively. 21 We also use 0.1 and 0.5 to represent low and high quality executives. Obviously our model assumes that executives do not learn or improve over time, but this assumption seems appropriate for an initial effort to understand how executive quality and effort affect option values.
Second, most executives hold more than the optimal level of t h e i r f i r ms ' s t o c k d u e t o vesting requirements and/or a negative signaling effect. Therefore, the stock component of nonoption wealth should be higher than the optimal level in the benchmark. Based on the optimal holding of risky assets from Merton (1969) , the optimal holding in the benchmark is 24%. 22 We assume the executive i n v e s t s 4 0 % o f h i s we a l t h i n t h e f i r m' s s t o c k as a benchmark to show that the executive bears higher than optimal firm-specific risk. In addition, we extend the stockwealth ratio to 30% and 50% for low and high stock holdings. From ExecuComp, we find that the average stock wealth in year-end 2005 is $39.2 million, but the median is $1.6 million. Using the median stock wealth and 40% stock-wealth ratio assumption, we use $4 million as a benchmark for total non-option wealth. The richer and poorer executives have $2 and $6 million in their non-option wealth respectively. The number of shares of stock is equal to the stock wealth divided by the current stock price.
From ExecuComp, we find that the median number of options granted in executive compensation is 21,000 and the mean is 78,970. So the distribution of granted options is highly skewed. When we use only the CEO in the database, the median and mean are 60,000 and 191,000 respectively. We use the median of these grants and set the number of granted options equal to 40,000 and use 20,000 and 60,000 options to observe the effect of low and high option grants.
The last executive parameter is the coefficient of risk aversion. From Pratt (1964) , the relation between absolute risk aversion, ARA, and relative risk aversion, RRA, is
The commonly used RRA is from 2 to 4. We use RRA = 2 as the benchmark and RRA = 1 and 3 as the lower and higher relative risk aversions. Because negative exponential utility has the 21 Because the elasticity of stock price is one of our parameters rather than the elasticity of sales or profit, we convert the elasticity of sales or profit into the elasticity of stock price. In the transformation, we need the elasticity of stock price with respect to sales and profit to generate the elasticity of stock price with respect to effort. Under the assumption that the elasticity of stock price with respect to sales and price is equal to 0.625 and 0.45 respectively, we find the elasticity of stock price with effort is 0.25. 22 The optimal holding of risky assets is the expected return divided by the product of relative risk aversion and the variance of the stock returns. In our benchmark case, the expected return is 12% and variance is 2 5 %. As s u mi n g t h e c o e f f i c i e n t o f r e l a t i v e r i s k a v e r s i o n i s 2 , t h e o p t i ma l h o l d i n g o f t h e f i r m' s s t o c k i s 2 4 %.
characteristic of constant absolute, rather than relative, risk aversion, the coefficient of ARA is 0.0000005 in the benchmark and 0.00000025 and 0.00000075 are for RRA = 1 and RRA = 3 respectively.
We use a monthly time step, which means h = 12, in the binomial model. 23 The optimal effort and executive option values are lower than those in the continuous-time model. The difference does not change our qualitative results. As noted previously, Lambert and Larcker (2004) identify a technical issue concerning the validity of the first-order condition in solving the a g e n t ' s p r o b l e m. Because we use the first-order condition to find the optimal effort, we examine whether this problem occurs in our model. To verify that the execut i v e ' s e x p e c t e d u t i l i t y i s we l lbehaved, we use the parameters in the benchmark and examine the relationship between expected utility and effort. We find the expected utility is a well-behaved concave function with respect to executive effort. Therefore, within the parameters chosen, the first-order condition is valid in our model.
Simulation Results
To identify the effects of our model, we conduct simulations using the various ranges of input parameters. These simulations are based on the condition that upon receipt of options, the executive maximizes his expected utility by choosing the optimal level of effort. Given the chosen effort along with the other input variables, the value of the option can be derived by the certainty equivalent method. A description of the full simulation procedure is contained in Appendix I.
Optimal Executive Effort
The optimal effort for the various parameter values is shown in Table 1 . The columns l a b e l e d " L o we r v a l u e , " " B e n c h ma r k , a n d " Hi g h e r v a l u e " r e f e r t o t h e a s s u mp t i o n o f t h e l o we r o f the three values of the input we vary, as shown in the first column. Three maturities are shown for each case. In addition, three moneyness levels are shown vertically with the top value representing the lowest stock price (out-of-the-money) and the lowest value representing the highest stock price (in-the-money).
We see that optimal effort is always greater than one, which means that it is always optimal for the executive to exert effort beyond that required to maintain the current stock price. Thus, at that minimum level of effort, the marginal benefit of effort exceeds the marginal cost.
As expected, the optimal level of effort varies widely for different inputs, being in some cases three times as high as in others. 23 The qualitative results do not change when we use a weekly time step, where h = 52.
We find that optimal effort decreases with moneyness, which means that out-of-themoney options induce more effort than in-the-money options. Because with out-of-the-money options, there is a lower probability of the options expiring with value, executives recognize that additional effort is required. But in all cases the differences in effort by moneyness are not very large. Hence, moneyness does not appear to be a strong factor in motivating executives. We will, however, return to this issue later.
We also see that optimal effort decreases with maturity, and the effect is quite strong.
That is, longer term options result in lower effort. When the maturity is shorter, there is less time for the option to expire in-the-money. The executive is, therefore, motivated to work harder. In contrast, if the maturity is longer, such as ten years, there is more time for the options to expire
in-the-money. The executive' s o d d s o f s u c c e s s a r e mu c h mo r e f a v o r a b l e f o r a g i v e n l e v e l o f
effort with a longer-term option. Consequently, the executive perceives that less effort is required.
In addition, disutility of effort is greater, the longer the period over which the effort is expended. 24 We also observe that optimal effort decreases considerably with non-option wealth and risk aversion and decreases moderately with the number of options, beta, and the expected market return. The effect of non-option wealth is determined by the domain of the utility function. Even though the coefficient of absolute risk aversion is constant, executives with different levels of wealth require different risk premiums for the same risky assets. Due to the characteristics of negative exponential utility, we expect that executive effort has a smaller effect on expected utility for relatively wealthier executives. Hence, under the same disutility function of effort, wealthier executives exert less effort than those less wealthy, and the effect is quite strong. In addition, because marginal utility with respect to effort decreases with risk aversion, more riskaverse executives should exert less effort to maximize their expected utility. This result is indeed confirmed in Table 1 , and the effect is strong.
The moderate negative effect of beta and the expected market return results from the fact that increases in these variables increase the expected return on the stock, which increases the expected value of the stock at expiration. We already found that effort is negatively related to the initial stock-wealth ratio. Here we see that the more stock wealth the executive expects to have at expiration, the less effort he chooses to exert at the start. It is somewhat surprising, however, that the number of options has little effect on effort. That is, more options induce slightly less effort, which is likely to result from the fact that additional options result in further concentration of the executive' s r i s k i n t h e f i r m.But the effect is not strong. Effort varies only slightly but in a positive manner by the stock-wealth ratio. Executives, therefore, exert slightly less effort the more their non-option wealth is committed to the company.
Executive effort has a non-monotonic relationship with the elasticity of stock price, with the greatest effect occurring at medium elasticity. This implies that medium quality executives work harder than low or high quality executives. This result has different explanations for different quality executives. From Equation (4), executive effort is negatively related to δ , which means executives with high quality exert less effort. That is what we observe from benchmark quality to high quality. For executives with low quality, one unit of their effort from low quality executives has the same disutility as others but less influence on stock price. It is optimal for them to exert less effort.
Optimal effort in general has a positive relation with volatility. Volatility affects the firm' sstock and the options in the e x e c u t i v e ' sportfolio, making the stock less valuable and the options more valuable. Therefore, the effect of volatility on effort is the sum of the effects of the firm stock and the options in the executive' s p o r t f o l i o . From Table 1 , holding the firm' sstock, which is represented in the stock-wealth ratio, has a positive effect but the number of options has a negative effect on effort. To compare the effect of firm stock and options, we compute the optimal effort with different combinations of stock and options and different volatilities in Table   2 .
First note the upper left cell in each volatility case where we assume no stock or options, which gives the base level of effort of 1.0. In each other case the addition of stock or options greatly increases the effort, which is consistent with the notion that executive ownership is beneficial to stockholders. Now consider the case of no options and the addition of stock. For the low volatility case, effort increases up to a 30% stock ratio and then decreases as more stock is added. For the medium and high volatility cases, effort always increases as stock is added.
When stock is added and options are already in place, the low volatility case reduces effort for all levels of stock ownership but continues to increase effort for the medium and high volatility cases, a result that is maintained even at high levels of option holdings. Now consider the case of no stock. Adding options increases effort initially and then begins to decrease effort as more options are added, though the effect is slower with higher volatility. For higher holdings of stock, however, increasing the number of options decreases the effort. 25 This finding is consistent with that of Grout and Zalewska (2006) . They show that the effect of high management ownership induced by an increase in options dampens the incentives to exert effort. Overall, it is seen that stock appears to be more effective at motivating executives.
To summarize our findings, the variables that have the greatest impact on effort are maturity, non-option wealth, and risk-aversion with greater effort found with shorter maturity options, executives with lower non-option wealth, and less risk-averse executives. Slightly greater effort is found for medium quality executives, executives of more volatile firms, lower beta firms, executives with higher stock-wealth ratios, and executives with fewer options. Outof-the-money options are slightly more effective at motivating executives to work harder.
Option Values
To determine how executive effort affects the values of the options, we compute option values with optimal effort, 1  and minimum effort, 1  . We summarize the values with and without optimal effort and the Black-Scholes-Merton values under different parameters in Table 3 .
First, we find an interesting and counterintuitive result. With only one exception (Panel B, volatility, without optimal effort, from three years to five years), executive option values in Panels A and B decrease with maturity, which is opposite that of standard option valuation intuition. 26 The principal reason is that the executive who holds stock options is different from an ordinary shareholder. Even with European options, shareholders can sell them when they need liquidity. In contrast if a manger wanted to sell his options, he could not do so, but the options could become more valuable as expiration approaches as the payoff date would be nearer. 27 This effect could dominate the time value decay. As we see in Table 3 , this occurs in nearly all cases.
We will see later that this effect will vanish when the options can be exercised early. Table 1 and Panel A in Table 3 . Given the differences in effort across maturity, we suspect that the relationship between maturities and executive option values, or the low volatility case. In the medium and higher volatility cases, however, options induce more effort than restricted stock and cash compensation. 26 This result is not unique to our model. When we use 50% volatility in the model of Hall and Murphy (2002) and keep other parameters the same as their assumptions, the option value also decreases when we change the maturity from 10 years to 15 years. 27 This result does not always occur when executives can hedge their risk through other financial instruments or the market portfolio. Hence, it is not present in the standard Black-Scholes-Merton analysis. Although mark-to-market accounting is not prescribed by FAS123R, this effect would be even higher as the maturity decreases, because the Black-Scholes-Merton value decreases as time elapses, while the executive option value increases. Thus, the FASB method, relying as it does on the maturity-attenuated Black-Scholes-Merton model, which itself assumes that the executive is a price taker, can seriously misvalue the option. Table 4 shows the ratio of option value with effort to value without effort. We see that option values with optimal effort are consistently higher than those with minimum effort, in most cases more than twice as high. This result holds for both in-the-money and out-of-the-money options for all variations of parameters. Interestingly, the ratios decrease with maturity, which is consistent with the pattern we observed for optimal effort in Table 1 . We know that the executive exerts more effort when the maturity is shorter. This additional factor magnifies the difference between option values with and without optimal effort. Of course it is not surprising that the difference in values is greater when the executive' s q u a l i t y i s h i g h . Even though high quality executives exert less effort, they still value their options higher than other executives. The ratios are also higher the lower the volatility, the lower the beta, the lower the market return, the lower 28 In Table 3 , we do not permit early exercise but to do so would make the point even stronger. As we will show in Table 6 , the value of this option if it is exercisable early is $16.
the non-option wealth, the higher the stock-wealth ratio, the lower the number of options, and the lower the risk aversion.
As noted above, option value to the executive can exceed the FASB prescribed value obtained using a maturity-reduced Black-Scholes-Merton model. But even without reducing the maturity, the executive could value the option at more than the Black-Scholes-Merton value. As is customarily done in the literature, we assume that the Black-Scholes-Merton values represent the firm cost. We then compute the ratio of option value with effort to firm cost and show the results in Table 5 . These ratios are low in the cases of ten-year maturities, but they increase when maturities decrease. This result is consistent with the previous analysis of t h e " negative"time This means that the executive would place a higher value on this illiquid instrument than would an outside investor place on a perfectly liquid version of the same option. This seemingly irrational result arises strictly because outside investors are price takers and executives are not.
In Table 1 we observed that optimal effort is moderately negatively related to moneyness.
That is, out-of-the-money options lead to greater effort. We explore this result further here by computing the optimal effort with respect to different exercise prices and show this relationship in Figure 1 . There are two major findings in Figure 1 . First, we find a positive relationship between optimal effort and exercise price in the 30% and 50% volatility cases. This result implies that out-of-the-money options induce more effort than in-the-money options, which is consistent with our findings in Section 4.1. When the exercise price is higher, it decreases the o p t i o n ' s p a y o f f .
29 In perfect market assumptions, this result could not happen because no one can consistently create abnormal returns. If we consider executive effort as a kind of intangible and unobservable asset of the firm and it can increase the expected firm value consistently, then this result could occur in some cases.
Therefore, greater effort is required to make the options expire in-the-money. Figure 1 also shows that options with positive exercise prices induce more effort than those with an exercise price of zero. This result implies that restricted stock, which is equivalent to an option with zero exercise price, induces less effort than ordinary stock options, which of course have positive exercise prices.
In the high volatility case we find a counterexample to our previous conclusion. Beyond a point, effort decreases with exercise price. The benefit of high volatility is such that a higher exercise price does not induce greater effort. A similar finding was reported by Feltham and Wu (2001) . From the 70% volatility case in Figure 1 , the highest effort exists at the exercise price of $14 rather than the at-the-money exercise price of $30. In addition, optimal effort increases with exercise prices from $0 to $14, which is the original observed result. When the exercise price exceeds $14, however, effort decreases with the exercise price because the marginal effect of the effort decreases. In this range, the positive effect of wealth reduction on effort is dominated by the negative effect of increasing exercise price on effort. Therefore, the executive exerts less effort if the exercise price is higher than $14. We illustrate the trade-off relationship between both effects on executive effort in Appendix II.
Early Exercise
Executive stock options are non-tradable and non-exercisable during the vesting period.
The only means of obtaining cash from these options is to exercise after the vesting period.
Under the assumption that optimal effort does not change with early exercise, we analyze the effect of optimal effort on the behavior of early exercise in this section. Using the binomial model, we summarize the values of the options after taking early exercise into account and the ratios of option values with effort to those without effort in Table 6 .
In comparing the European option values in Table 3 with the American option values in Table 6 , we see that, as expected, the addition of early exercise increases the values of the options, regardless of whether effort is considered. In keeping with intuition, the early exercise premium is naturally larger for longer maturities. In Table 6 we again see that all numbers in Panel A, with effort, are greater than those in Panel B, without effort. Panel C shows the ratio of values with effort to without. Even though the addition of early exercise alleviates the problem of underestimation of these option values, we still find some option values with consideration of effort more than twice those without effort.
In addition, the negative relation between option values and maturities disappears in Panel B, without effort, that is, after consideration of early exercise. 30 This result is consistent with the explanation we provide in Section 4.2. Because the liquidity discount is reduced due to early exercise, the effect of positive time value is recovered in the option value without executive effort. In Panel A, however, we continue to see that shorter maturity options are worth more after accounting for effort. Thus, the effect of effort dominates the value of exercising the options early to overcome their illiquidity.
From the literature, two important factors that should substantially affect the decision to exercise early are the executive' s s t o c k holdings and his risk aversion. When executives are more risk averse or have high stock holdings, they may value the benefits of volatility in the future at least than the value of receiving cash now. Thus, they may choose to exercise at lower stock prices. In the previous results with effort, we saw that elasticity, which proxies for executive quality, can play an important role in the determination of option values, which can dominate these two factors. To examine this question, we estimate liquidity premiums by comparing the option values with effort but without early exercise to those with effort and with early exercise.
These results are shown for different elasticities, maturities, and degrees of moneyness in Table 7 .
We see in Panel C that the liquidity premium increases with moneyness and maturity.
Because in-the-money options have a higher probability of expiring in-the-money, the executive has a better chance to realize value through early exercise. Therefore, early exercise is more valuable for in-the-money options than out-of-the-money options. Following the previous explanation of the liquidity discount, we know that longer maturity leads to a higher liquidity premium. Therefore the liquidity premium increases with maturity. We also see that there is no consistent relationship between liquidity premium and elasticity. When the maturity is 10 years, the liquidity premium increases with the elasticity, but when the maturity is three years, the liquidity premium decreases with the elasticity. Therefore with longer maturity, the addition of early exercise is more valuable for executives with high quality, because capable executives can choose to exercise their options after the stock price reflects their effort in the long run. Hence, we expect capable executives would exercise at higher stock prices.
To verify the relation between the elasticity of stock price and the decision to exercise early, we compute the threshold price, which is the critical stock price for the decision of early exercise. We summarize these threshold prices with respect to the elasticity of stock price that implies different executive quality in Figure 2 . We see that the threshold prices are positively related to the elasticity of stock price and, hence, executive quality. For example, in year 3, the executive with the lowest quality, 0.1  , will exercise the options when the stock price is above $58.58, but the executive with highest quality, 0.5  , will wait until the stock price is over $73.73. This result is consistent with our expectation. Suppose executives know their ability and the effort they exert. Holding the options longer can increase their expected wealth, which also increases their expected utility. Based on the higher expected utility of continuing to hold the option, the threshold prices should be higher for more capable executives. The behavior, however, is not significantly different in the last year. From this result, we expect the executive who exerts more effort will exercise at a higher stock price. Therefore, the effect of the effort would interact with that of risk aversion or stock holdings on the behavior of early exercise, which is examined in the following analysis.
From the results in Section 4.1, we know the executive would exert more effort with higher stock holdings but less effort with higher risk aversion. Hence, the decision to exercise early with respect to different risk aversion should be similar with the finding in the literature without consideration of executive effort. The more risk-averse executive would exercise stock options at lower stock prices, after taking effort into account. In Figure 3 , we show the threshold stock prices for two different executive qualities (elasticities) of 0.25 and 0.50 and risk aversions of 0.0000005 and 0.00000075. First we see that the more risk-averse executive exercises at a lower stock price regardless of his quality. We also see that the lower quality executive exercises at a lower stock price regardless of risk aversion. The highest threshold stock price is for the less risk averse and higher quality executive, and the lowest is for the more risk averse and lower quality executive. Thus, higher quality executives will hold out for a higher stock price, and this effect is even greater the less risk averse they are. But lower quality executives may hold out for a higher stock price if they are less risk averse.
An existing result in the literature states that less diversified executives would exercise at a lower stock price compared with ordinary diversified investors, who are of course price takers.
Because executives can reduce firm-specific risk by early exercise, they would do it as soon as the options are vested. This is the result without consideration of executive ability. From the previous analysis, we know that there is a counteracting effect between stock wealth and executive effort resulting from the stock-wealth ratio on the behavior of early exercise. The change in the threshold stock price with respect to the stock-wealth ratio is shown in Figure 4 .
We consider two stock-wealth ratios, 40% and 50%, and two elasticities, 0.25 and 0.5. The executive with more exposure to the stock (50% ratio) will exercise at a lower stock price.
Naturally this executive will want to reduce exposure earlier than will the executive with less exposure (40% ratio). As previously found, the lower quality executive will exercise at a lower stock price. But the less exposed executive with lower quality will exercise before (at a lower stock price) than will the more exposed executive with higher quality.
Conclusion
It has become widely accepted that because of illiquidity, the values of executive stock options are less, and often far less, than the values of traded options. But unlike ordinary investors, executives are not price takers. While it is true that executives cannot sell their options and liquidity is at least partially limited by vesting requirements, it is also true that executives have the ability to influence the payoffs of their options. Indeed the principal reason why executives are granted options is to motivate them to take actions that will increase the stock price.
Clearly executives would like to take actions that drive up the stock price without limit, but such actions are not costless. Executive effort creates disutility. In addition, executives differ by their quality and undertake different degrees of effort.
In this paper we model the process by which executives of varying quality choose their optimal effort and how this factor translates into the values of stock options. We find that executive ability and the amount of effort that executives undertake can greatly affect the valuation of their options. We show that executives exert effort that is greater than the minimum effort that supports the current stock price. Consequently, executive effort increases the value of the stock and the options. In fact, the values of stock options can even exceed their BlackScholes-Merton values. In addition we find that executive effort can influence early exercise behavior. Higher quality executives exercise their options at a higher stock price. This result implies that executives may postpone their decision to exercise their options until their effort is reflected in the stock price.
By incorporating the influence that executives have on the payoffs of options and the cost of executive effort, we do not treat executives as ordinary investors. It should not be surprising, therefore, that executives are far more willing to hold options than they are found to be when we use traditional models. Hence, executives value options more highly than they would if they were treated, as in most models in the literature, like ordinary investors. Thus, these findings cast a view on the values of executive stock options that sharply contrasts with conventional thinking. Exercise price
Optimal effort
Expected utility is computed under the benchmark assumptions of maturity = 10 years, volatility = 50%, 30%, and 70%, expected market return = 12%, beta = 1, elasticity of stock price = 0.25, non-option wealth = $4 million, stock-wealth ratio = 40%, and coefficient of absolute risk aversion = 0.0000005. The exercise price changes $1 at a time from $0 to $60. The total Black-Scholes-Merton value of these options is $400,000 under different exercise prices. Therefore, the number of options is generated by using $400,000 divided by the Black-Scholes-Merton value under different exercise prices. The current stock price is $30. The threshold price is the critical price for the decision to exercise early. When the stock price is higher than the threshold price, the executive will exercise his options. Otherwise, the executive will hold these options and re-evaluate whether to exercise at the next time step. We change the elasticity of stock price but keep all other parameters as their benchmark values. Because the threshold price is a stepwise function, we smooth the curve by using linear interpolation. In addition, we also increase the number of time steps each year from 12 to 100. The threshold price is the critical price for the decision to exercise early. When the stock price is higher than the threshold price, the executive will exercise his options. Otherwise, the executive will hold these options and re-evaluate whether to exercise at the next time step. We change the coefficient of absolute risk aversion and the elasticity of stock price but keep all other parameters as their benchmark values. Because the threshold price is a stepwise function, we smooth the curve by using linear interpolation. In addition, we also increase the number of time steps each year from 12 to 100. The threshold price is the critical price for the decision to exercise early. When the stock price is higher than the threshold price, the executive will exercise his options. Otherwise, the executive will hold these options and re-evaluate whether to exercise at the next time step. We change the stock-wealth ratio but keep all other parameters as their benchmark values. Because the threshold price is a stepwise function, we smooth the curve by using linear interpolation. In addition, we also increase the number of time steps each year from 12 to 100. 
